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Non-technical summary  
The fact that women generally earn less than men has stimulated much discussion in industrialized 
countries since the 1970th. Therefore, the level as well as the sources of the gender wage gap are in the 
focus of the scientific community and are of broad public interest.  
The key issue in this study is the extent to which the observed gender wage gap can be explained by 
individual characteristics such as education and work experience and how much is due to selection 
into different establishments. Based on a decomposition method, the observed wage gap is assigned to 
four explanatory components: (1) Difference in the individual characteristics, (2) Difference in the 
remuneration of these individual characteristics, (3) Difference in establishment characteristics, (4) 
Difference in the remuneration of these establishment characteristics. Beyond the decomposition of 
the mean wage gap, the decomposition is undertaken across the entire wage distribution. This study 
consequently links two aspects of current empirical research on the gender wage gap. On the one hand, 
the establishment level is included in the study and, on the other hand, the analysis is extended to 
include the entire wage distribution.  
Based on linked employer-employee data the finding is that, on average, women earn 23.5 per cent 
less than men. The gender wage gap is larger in the lower tail of the wage distribution than on the 
upper tail. The decomposition of the observed wage gap shows that the four defined decomposition 
components vary only mildly across the wage distribution. Only a small part of the wage gap is due to 
differences in the individual characteristics between men and women. In the middle of the wage 
distribution women are even endowed with better individual characteristics. The segregation of men 
and women into different firms also explains part of the wage gap, particularly at the lower end of the 
wage distribution. The largest part of the wage gap is referred to differences in the remuneration of 
establishment characteristics. It is apparent that even if men and women have the same individual 
characteristics, receive the same remuneration of these individual characteristics and work in the same 
firm, women still earn 16 per cent less than men on average. This within-firm wage gap is more 
pronounced at the lower end of the wage distribution than at the top end.  
In summary, the sources of the gender wage gap do not differ much between individuals in the lower 
and the upper part of the wage distribution. Compared with the selection of men and women into 
different establishments, differences in qualification between men and women explain only a small 
part of the observed wage differential.  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze:  
Lohnunterschiede zwischen Männern und Frauen sind seit den 1970er Jahren wiederholt Gegenstand 
kontroverser Diskussionen in den Industrieländern. Dabei stehen sowohl das Niveau und als auch die 
Ursachen des geschlechtsspezifischen Lohndifferentials im Mittelpunkt des öffentlichen und wissen-
schaftlichen Diskurses. Diese Studie geht der Frage nach, wie viel des beobachteten Lohn-
unterschiedes zwischen Männern und Frauen durch unterschiedlich individuelle Merkmale wie 
Bildung und Berufserfahrung erklärt werden kann, und wie viel auf die Selektion in unterschiedliche 
Betriebe zurückzuführen ist. Hierzu wird der beobachtete Lohnunterschied in vier Erklärungs-
komponenten zerlegt: den Unterschied in individuellen Merkmalen, den Unterschied in der Bewertung 
dieser individuellen Merkmale, den Unterschied in den Firmenmerkmalen sowie den Unterschied in 
der Bewertung dieser Firmenmerkmale. Über die Betrachtung des mittleren Lohnunterschieds hinaus 
wird die Zerlegung über die gesamte Lohnverteilung vorgenommen. Damit verbindet diese Studie 
zwei Stränge in der aktuellen empirischen Forschung zu geschlechts-spezifischen Lohnunterschieden. 
Zum einen wird die Betriebsebene in die Untersuchung einbezogen, und zum anderen die Analyse auf 
die gesamte Lohnverteilung ausgedehnt.  
Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass Frauen durchschnittlich 23,5% weniger verdienen als Männer. Am 
unteren Ende der Lohnverteilung ist der geschlechtsspezifische Lohnunterschied größer als am oberen 
Rand. Bei der Zerlegung des beobachteten Lohnunterschieds zeigt sich, dass die vier definierten 
Komponenten nur leicht über die Lohnverteilung schwanken. Auf Unterschiede in den Individual-
merkmalen zwischen Männern und Frauen ist nur ein kleiner Teil des Differentials zurückzuführen. 
Im mittleren Bereich der Lohnverteilung verfügen Frauen sogar über höherwertige Individual-
merkmale, wie beispielsweise höhere Bildungsabschlüsse. Die Verteilung von Männern und Frauen 
auf unterschiedliche Firmen erklärt einen größeren Teil des Lohnunterschiedes, insbesondere am 
unteren Ende der Lohnverteilung. Der größte Teil des Lohnunterschieds bleibt allerdings unerklärt. Es 
zeigt sich: Selbst wenn Männer und Frauen über die gleichen individuellen Merkmale verfügen und in 
den gleichen Firmen arbeiten, verdienen Frauen im Durchschnitt 16 % weniger als Männer. Dieser 
inner-betriebliche Lohnunterschied ist am unteren Ende der Lohnverteilung stärker ausgeprägt als am 
oberen Ende.  
Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass sich die Ursachen des geschlechtsspezifischen Lohn-
unterschiedes für geringe und hohe Einkommensgruppen nicht sehr voneinander unterscheiden. 
Qualifikationsunterschiede zwischen Männern und Frauen erklären im Vergleich zur Selektion von 
Männern und Frauen in unterschiedliche Firmen nur einen kleinen Teil des beobachteten Lohn-
unterschieds. Der letztlich unerklärte Lohnunterschied kann zum einen auf Lohndiskriminierung und 
zum anderen auf unbeobachtete Qualifikations- und Betriebscharakteristika zurückgehen. 
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Abstract  
Using linked employer-employee data, this study measures and decomposes the differences in 
the earnings distribution between male and female employees in Germany. I extend the 
traditional decomposition to disentangle the effect of human capital characteristics and the 
effect of firm characteristics in explaining the gender wage gap. Furthermore, I implement the 
decomposition across the whole wage distribution with the method proposed by Machado and 
Mata (2005). Thereby, I take into account the dependence between the human capital 
endowment of individuals and workplace characteristics. The selection of women into less 
successful and productive firms explains a sizeable part of the gap. This selection is more 
pronounced in the lower part of the wage distribution than in the upper tail. In addition, 
women also benefit from the success of firms by rent-sharing to a lesser extent than their male 
colleagues. This is the source of the largest part of the pay gap. Gender differences in human 
capital endowment as well as differences in returns to human capital are less responsible for 
the wage differential.  
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1 Motivation 
 
The gender wage gap has been extensively studied in the labor economics and sociological 
literature. Even though the pay differential tends to shrink over time, a sizeable gender wage 
gap persists (see for example, the international evidence in Blau and Kahn, 1996, 2003 and 
the OECD 2002). Identifying the different source of wage differentials is crucial for 
explaining and understanding this persistence. In addition, policy options are different 
depending on the underlying reasons for the wage differentials.  
Traditionally, the gap has been explained by gender differences in the human capital 
endowment and its reward in the labor market. A widely-used way to explore gender wage 
differentials empirically is to decompose the observed mean gap into a component attributable 
to differences in human capital characteristics (endowment part) and a component referring to 
differences in returns to these characteristics (remuneration part). This decomposition into 
two parts was introduced by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).  
More recently, gender segregation as a further source of wage differentials has moved more 
and more into the focus of scholarly interest. The empirical finding is that the segregation of 
women into low-paying labor market structures is a major source of wage differentials 
between men and women (e.g. Groshen 1991a, Dolado et al. 2004, Bayard et al. 2003). 
Although the seminal studies in this field emphasize the importance of female segregation 
into low-paying occupations (see for an overview Sorensen 1990), more recent studies have 
extended the analysis to firm segregation and conclude that this segregation is also an 
important source of gender wage differentials (e.g. Groshen 1991a, Carrington and Troske 
1998, Reilly and Wirjanto 1999, Bayard et al. 2003). The importance of firm segregation of 
men and women is related to empirical findings which point to the influence of labor demand-
side factors in wage determinations. This empirical literature shows that wage differentials 
can also be the result of inter-firm wage differentials (overview in Abowd and Kramarz 
1999). Thereby the inter-firm wage differentials can be attributed to different reasons, such as 
compensating wage differentials, efficiency wage payments, institutional settings or rent-
sharing processes (see for a theoretical overview Groshen 1991b). Since men and women 
work in different firms, these inter-firm wage differentials can also have an impact on the 
gender wage gap.  
One purpose of this study is to disentangle the effect of differences in personal characteristics 
and the effect of selection into different firms of women and men on the gender wage gap. For 
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this aim, the wage equations include establishment characteristics in addition to individual 
characteristics and the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition is extended. 
Another relevant finding in the recent gender wage gap literature is that the gap is very 
complex and varies across the wage distribution. Albrecht et al. (2003), for instance, detect 
that while the average gender wage gap is indeed relatively small in Sweden, the gap 
increases throughout the wage distribution and rises even more in the upper tail. They 
conclude that the earnings potential of women in the upper part of the wage distribution is 
limited (glass ceiling effect). Hence, assuming a constant wage gap throughout the wage 
distribution is misleading because this could wrongly lead us to conclude the gender wage gap 
to be of minor importance. Furthermore, the traditional approach is based on the assumption 
that the importance of explanatory factors does not vary with the wage rate. This assumption 
is not very realistic. Among others, Albrecht et al. (2003) show an increasing impact of 
education on the wage differential across the wage distribution. In fact, there are many good 
reasons to believe that male and female wages are also not equally affected by innovative 
human resource practices and institutional settings across the wage distribution. In particular, 
firm characteristics describing the collective bargaining and co-determination are supposed to 
be more important in the wage determination process of employees with low earnings because 
these workers belong to the main target group of unions. Furthermore, it is conceivable that 
firm’s profits have a stronger impact on the wage rate of highly-paid employees because they 
are more likely to get corresponding bonus payments.  
As an additional contribution, therefore, this study decomposes the gender wage gap across 
the wage distribution and thus combines two important strands of the recent empirical 
literature. On the one hand differences in the workplaces of male and female employees are 
taken into account and on the other hand the analysis is extended to the entire wage 
distribution. More precisely, I include a detailed set of firm characteristics in addition to 
individual characteristics as wage determinants. Then in order to decompose the observed 
wage gap, I apply an extension of the traditional OB decomposition to disentangle the effect 
of personnel characteristics (including human capital and occupations) and the effect of firm 
characteristics in explaining the gender wage gap. The extended decomposition results in four 
terms: one attributable to differences in individual characteristics, one referring to differences 
in returns to individual characteristics, another that captures differences in firm-specific 
characteristics and finally one resulting from differences in returns to these characteristics. In 
order to accommodate differences across the wage distribution, the four decompositions terms 
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are implemented at each percentile of the wage distribution. To this end a flexible parametric 
method introduced by Machado and Mata (2005) is applied.  
The empirical analysis is based on a large German linked employer-employee data set. The 
comparison of the wage information for male and female employees in the sample shows that 
the raw gender wage gap is sharply decreasing within the first quartile, the decrease then 
decelerates until the 60th percentile, and after that the gap is slightly increasing again.  
The decomposition shows that the selection of women into less successful and productive 
firms explains a sizeable part of the gap. This selection is more pronounced in the lower part 
of the wage distribution than in the upper part. In addition, women benefit from the success of 
firms to a lesser extent than their male colleagues. This is the source of the largest part of the 
pay gap. Gender differences in individual characteristics as well as differences in returns to 
these characteristics play a smaller role in explaining the wage differential.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the literature 
on decomposing gender wage gaps throughout the wage distribution. The econometric 
methodology is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data source and the 
specification of the wage equations. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Finally 
Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.  
2 Decomposing the gender wage gap: Some background 
 
A decomposition analysis is a standard approach to explore the wage differential between 
male and female employees. It is often used to examine the sources of the gap and to answer 
the question, how much of the gap is attributable to discrimination. In this approach the mean 
wage differential is decomposed into one part capturing differences in characteristics and 
another part referring to different returns using the estimates of male and female wage 
equations (Oaxaca 1973 and Blinder 1973). The latter part is called the unexplained part of 
the wage differential or the remuneration effect. This fraction of the gap is often used as a 
measure of wage discrimination.1  
However, one drawback of this standard approach by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) is 
the focus on the average gender wage differential. Thus, potentially important variations of 
the wage differences across the wage distribution are not taken into account. Hence, the 
 
1 However, Altonji and Blank (1999) argue in their survey article “Race and Gender in the Labor Market” that 
this is a misleading terminology, because if any control variables are omitted that are correlated with the 
included characteristics, then the coefficients will be affected. The unexplained part therefore captures both the 
effects of discrimination and unobserved gender differences in productivity and tastes. Furthermore, 
discriminatory barriers in the labor market can also affect the characteristics (such as education) of individuals.  
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attention in empirical gender studies has shifted towards investigating the degree to which 
the gender wage gap varies across the wage distribution. For instance, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1998) decompose changes in the US gender wage gap at various wage percentiles. They 
apply rank regressions to estimate the probability of an individual being in a certain wage 
segment given this individual’s characteristics. Bonjour and Gerfin (2001) apply a 
methodology proposed by Donald et al. (2000) to decompose the gender wage gap across the 
earnings distributions in Switzerland. The basic idea of the applied method is to recover 
estimates of the density and distribution functions from the estimated parameters of a hazard 
function. 
Most recently, studies use quantile regressions in order to decompose the gender wage gap at 
different points of the wage distribution. García et al. (2001) propose to use quantile 
regressions in order to compare quantiles of the male and the female wage distribution 
conditional on the same set of characteristics as an approximation of the unexplained part of 
the gap. However, their decomposition of the Spanish gender wage gap evaluates the vector 
of characteristics of men and women at only one point, the unconditional mean, regardless of 
which quantile is considered. Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) consider it more suited to 
weight the difference in returns to a certain characteristic (for example primary education) at 
a given quantile according to the proportion of individuals with this characteristic at that 
quantile. Based on this methodological approach, their findings for the Spanish wage gap 
contradict the results of García et al. (2001). While in the analysis of García et al. (2001) the 
part of the gender wage gap due to different returns to characteristics increases throughout 
the wage distribution, Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) find the opposite to be the case.  
Considering only the mean of the regressors like García et al. (2001) neglects some 
important factors explaining the difference between the two distributions. Assume, for 
instance, that the sample means of the characteritics are the same for males and females, but 
the variance is much higher for males. In this setting, the distribution of the dependent 
variable will also have a higher variance for males. This feature can not be analyzed with the 
method suggested by García et al. (2001) or the one used by Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005). 
Machado and Mata (2005) (MM) hence propose an alternative decomposition procedure 
which combines a quantile regression and a bootstrap approach in order to estimate 
counterfactual density functions. Albrecht et al. (2003) applied this method for the first time 
to decompose the gender wage gap in Sweden. They show that the gender wage gap in 
Sweden increases throughout the wage distribution and rises in the upper tail. The authors 
interpret this as a strong glass ceiling effect. The wage gap also increases throughout the 
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wage distribution after controlling for gender differences in individual characteristics. Using 
the same estimation strategy, De la Rica et al. (2008) show that the gender wage gap in 
Spain is much flatter than in Sweden. However, if the sample is split according to education, 
the authors also find a glass ceiling effect for the group of high skilled employees, while the 
gender wage gap decreases throughout the wage distribution for workers with low education. 
Albrecht et al. (2009) investigate the gender wage gap in the Netherlands using the MM 
decomposition method and take into account a selection of women into full time 
employment. Thus, the authors’ purpose is to make statements for all employed women 
regardless of their hours of work. Also applying the MM decomposition method, 
Arulampalam et al. (2007) explore the wage differential for eleven European countries. 
Their results show a u-shaped raw wage gap for the private sector in Germany. However, in 
the public sector the gender wage gap is smaller and wider at the left hand side. While the 
unexplained part of wage differential is nearly constant across the wage distribution in the 
private sector, this part decrease throughout the distribution in the public sector. Beblo et al. 
(2003) also take into account the whole distribution in their analysis of the gender wage gap 
in Germany by using the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (Juhn et al. 1993) decomposition. They pool 
employees of the public and private sector and find a u-shaped raw wage gap. Furthermore 
their results show that the part explained by differences in individual characteristics 
increases throughout the distribution. The part attributable to difference in returns to these 
characteristics has the reverse pattern. The results of Hübler (2005) differ from Beblo et al. 
(2003). He considers the gender wage differential over a time period from 1984 to 2002. In 
his study the raw wage gap decreases with increasing quantiles of the wage distribution. 
Based on a combination of linear local matching and quantile regressions he shows that the 
unexplained wage differences between males and females are larger in the higher percentiles 
of the wage distribution. Furthermore, the difference in the unexplained wage gap between 
the 10th and 90th percentile narrows over time. Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005) like Hübler 
(2005) find that the German gender wage gap is highest in the lower part and lowest in the 
upper part of the distribution. Their study highlights that occupational segregation and lower 
occupational mobility among females may explain the gender wage gap, a result that differs 
across the wage distribution. Using the MM decomposition method they show that in the 
lower part of wage distribution, females benefit less from occupational mobility than males. 
In the upper tail the gains are similar for both sexes.  
My study differs from existing studies in three respects. First, I include a set of detailed 
establishment characteristics in addition to individual characteristics as explanatory 
variables. Second, I extend the traditional OB decomposition to disentangle the effect of 
individual characteristics and the effect of establishment characteristics in explaining the 
mean gender wage gap. Finally, I implement the decomposition across the entire wage 
distribution with the MM method. Based on this most flexible parametric decomposition, I 
provide new insights into the nature and the sources of gender wage inequality in Germany. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Wage regression  
OLS and most other estimation approaches are used to investigate mean effects. In this 
framework the effect of covariates operates only as a shift factor. Koenker and Bassett 
(1978) introduced a more flexible approach, the quantile regression model. This model 
allows for studying marginal effects of covariates on the dependent variable at various points 
in the distribution, not just at the mean. There is a comprehensive literature concerning the 
application of quantile regressions, see Fitzenberger et al. (2001) and Koenker and Hallock 
(2001) for surveys.  
Let  denote the log wage of worker i. iw iX  is a vector of covariates representing his 
individual characteristics, whereas iZ  represents establishment characteristics. The statistical 
model specifies the θ quantile of the conditional distribution of  given th iw iX and iZ  as a 
linear function of the covariates,  
 ( ) ( ), ,     0,1i i i i iQ w X Z X Zθ θ θβ δ θ= + ∈ .                (1) 
As shown by Koenker and Bassett (1978), the quantile regression coefficients θβ  and θδ  are 
estimated as the solution to the following minimization problem:2 
     ( )
, : :
ˆ
arg min 1 .
ˆ
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i w X Z i w X Z
w X Z w X Zθ
β δ β δ β δθ
β θ β δ θ β δδ ≥ + < +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ −   (2) 
The estimated quantile regression coefficients, θˆβ  and θˆδ , are interpreted as the estimated 
returns to individual and establishment characteristics at the θ quantile of the log wage 
distribution.  
th
Since wages observed in the data are censored from above at the social security taxation 
threshold sc , one observes only { }min ,iw w= i c
                                                
. Powell (1984, 1986) developed censored 
 
 6
2 Consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimators can be proved if the minimization problem (2) is 
transferred into a GMM framework (see e.g. Buchinsky 1998). The asymptotic covariance matrix of the 
estimator can also be derived from this model framework.  
quantile regressions as a robust extension to the censored regression problem. There are 
different algorithms to solve this non-convex optimization problem in the literature (see e.g. 
Buchinsky 1994, Koenker and Park 1996 or Fitzenberger 1997a, 1997b). However, as the 
access to the data3 is limited and the sample size is large it is not possible to implement 
censored quantile regressions. As an alternative, I apply quantile regressions after imputing 
estimated uncensored wages (see Gartner 2005). As described in the next section, right-
censored observations are replaced by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal 
distribution. The predicted wages from a Tobit wage regression are used to construct the 
moments of this truncated normal distribution. The lower truncation point of the truncated 
normal distribution is given by the contribution limit of the social security system. In the 
Tobit regression model, the same exogenous variables are used as in the quantile regression 
model.  
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for the quantile regression estimates can be 
obtained by means of the design matrix bootstraps (see e.g. Kohn 2006). Again, because of 
the limited access to the data, I cannot estimate standard errors. Nevertheless the 
decomposition method applied in this study, still yields valuable insights.  
3.2 Decomposition 
The quantile regression analysis provides detailed insights into the remuneration of observed 
worker and establishment characteristics for men and women across the whole wage 
distribution. A decomposition analysis can complement the regression evidence by showing 
whether differences in observed distributions follow from differences in estimated 
coefficients or from differences in the composition of the workforce. In an OB 
decomposition, the gender wage gap is evaluated at the average characteristics of male (m) 
and female (f) employees:4 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆm f m f m f m fw w X X X ˆβ β β− = − + − ,        (3) 
where gw  is the mean of the log wage for ,g m f= , gX  the vector of average 
characteristics of male and female employees and ˆ gβ  the estimated vector of returns to 
characteristics. The first term on the right hand side of equation (3) represents the part of the 
                                                 
3 The data are only available at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency (BA) in 
Nuremberg. The FDZ offers the possibility to work with the data on site and to send programs to a remote data 
access. However, the computation time is limited. 
4 The mean gender wage gap in equation (3) is decomposed by adding and simultaneous subtracting a 
counterfactual wage 
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ˆc f mw X  from the difference between the average male and average female wage. = β
wage gap due to different characteristics of males and females, whereas the second term is 
the part attributable to differences in the returns to these characteristics. In order to 
distinguish between individual characteristics ( )X  and establishment characteristics ( )Z  I 
extend the OB decomposition in the following way: 
         ( ) ( ) ( ()
 8
)
( ) ( )( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .m f m f m f m f m f m f m f
i iiiii iv
w w X X X Z Z Zβ β δ δ δ− = − + − − + −	 	
	
 	
βˆ +
     (4) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4) captures the part of the wage differential 
that is attributable to differences in individual characteristics (i). The third term shows the 
component of the wage gap due to differences in the establishment characteristics (iii). The 
second and the forth term represent the components attributable to differences in the returns 
to individual characteristics (ii) and to establishment characteristics (iv), respectively. In 
order to decompose the gender wage gap as in equation (4), I use as counterfactual wage5   
ˆc f m fw X Z ˆmβ δ= +            (5) 
that reflects what the log wage would have been had females receive the same returns to 
characteristics as their male counterparts. The approach assumes that male returns are the 
relevant benchmark for the distribution in the absence of any “discrimination”.6  
The approach in equation (4) considers only differences in the average earnings. As stated 
above, the average wage gap is not representative of the gap at different quantiles of the 
wage distribution. Garcia et al. (2001) combine the OB decomposition technique with 
quantile regressions to determine the decomposition terms at various points of the wage 
distribution. They consider the mean of the covariates and quantile regression estimates. 
Thus differences in higher moments of the distribution of the independent variables are not 
controlled for. The method proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) can account for such 
differences. It combines a quantile regression model with a bootstrap approach to simulate 
counterfactual wage densities.7  
                                                 
w
5 It is well known that the partition depends on the ordering of the effects and that the decomposition results may 
not be invariant with respect to the choice of the involved counterfactual. See the surveys of Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994) and Silber and Weber (1999). Therefore, the choice of a counterfactual should be guided by the questions 
of economic interest.  
6 Most other studies to the gender wage gap use male returns as benchmark and thus comparisons are possible.  
7  The MM method relies on the following ideas. First, the conditional quantiles of  given by equation (1) can 
be estimated by quantile regressions. Second, the probability integral transformation theorem is used: If U is 
uniformly distributed on [ F . Thus, for given [ ]]0,1 (, then )1 U−  has distribution F X :i iZ
[
 and a random 
]0,1Uθ ∼ i i, X Zθ θβ δ+  has the same distribution as ,i i iw X Z . If [ ]X : Z  are randomly drawn from the 
population, instead of keeping [ ]:i iX Z  fixed, X Zθ θβ δ+  has the same distribution as  (see also Melly 
2005). 
w
In order to save computation time, I apply a simplification of the MM techniques as 
suggested in Albrecht et al. (2003).  Formally, the estimation procedure involves four steps: 
1. Estimate quantile regression coefficients at each single percentile for male and 
female employees:   This results in 99 coefficient 
vectors for males and 99 coefficient vectors for females. 
ˆ ˆ
,  ;   0.01...0.99.
ˆ ˆ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
m f
m f
θ θ
θ θ
β β θδ δ
2. Randomly draw samples of size M=10000 with replacement from the set of 
covariates [ ]:X Z  for each estimated coefficient vector:  
{ } { } { }
1 1
: ;  : ;  :
1
M M Mm m f f f m
i i i i i ii i
X Z X Z X Z= =
     
i= . 
3. Calculate { }
1
ˆ ˆ Mm m m m m
i i i i
w X Zθ θβ δ == +   and { } 1ˆ ˆ Mf f f f fi i i iw X Zθ θβ δ == +   for each estimated 
coefficient vector. These data sets are random samples of 99M × observations from 
the marginal wage distributions of w  which is consistent with the linear model in 
equation  (1). 
4. Generate the following random samples of the counterfactual distributions with the 
estimated coefficients of each percentile: 
{ } { } { }1 2 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,   and 
1
M M Mf m m m f f m m f f f m
i i i i i i i i ii i
w X Z w X Z w X Zθ θ θ θ θ θβ δ β δ β δ= == + = + = +        i=  
1w  is the hypothetical log wage for female employees if they had the establishment 
characteristics of male employees and had been paid as male employees.  is the 
hypothetical log wage for female employees if they had the establishment 
characteristics of male employees and only those characteristics had the same returns 
as for male employees. Finally,  denotes the hypothetical log wage for female 
employees as their establishment characteristics had been rewarded as they are for 
men. 
2w
3w
The empirical implementation of this procedure is, however, not straightforward. In the 
second step of the estimation procedure above, I have to draw a random sample that contains 
random draws of women’s individual characteristics and men’s establishment 
characteristics. If the characteristics were independent it would be possible to assign the 
randomly drawn female to any drawn male employee. However, it is not very realistic to 
assume independency between individual and establishment covariates. In contrast, a self 
selection of individuals into certain firms is much more likely. Alternatively, employers 
demand employees with certain skills. In order to incorporate the correlation between 
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individual and establishment covariates, I decide for the following assignment strategy 
guided by the economic meaning behind the counterfactual wage distributions in step 4:  
First I constitute a random sample of M female employees. After this I implement a 
matching on the Mahalanobis distance in order to assign each woman to a similar male 
worker with respect to individual characteristics. From the matched pairs I consider the 
individual characteristics from the female employees and the establishment characteristics 
from the matched male employees.  
Based on the estimation results generated by the procedure described above, I can 
decompose the gender wage gap into the contribution of the individual characteristics and 
the establishment characteristics as well as the contribution of the returns to individual 
characteristics and establishment characteristics. In order to simplify the comparison to the 
OB decomposition, I decompose the quantiles of the wage distribution as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2
( ) ( )
2 3 3
( ) ( )
                             .
m f m
i ii
f
iii iv
Q w Q w Q w Q w Q w Q w
Q w Q w Q w Q w R
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡− = − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣
⎡ ⎤ ⎡+ − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣
   	
 	

   	
 	

⎤⎦
⎤ +⎦
    (6) 
In analogy to equation (4) there are four terms and an additional residual term. The first term 
(i) represents the contribution of individual characteristics and the second term (ii) denotes 
the contribution of the corresponding coefficients to the difference between the thθ  quantile 
of the male wage distribution and the thθ  quantile of the female wage distribution. The third 
term (iii) refers to the contribution of the establishment characteristics and the fourth term 
(iv) is the contribution of the corresponding coefficients to the difference between thθ  
quantile of the male wage distribution and thθ quantile of the female wage distribution. The 
last term is a residual term in equation (6). It includes sampling errors which disappear with 
more observations, simulation errors which disappear with more simulations and 
specification errors by estimating a linear quantile regression. Assuming that my 
specification is correct, the residual term asymptotically tends to zero and equation (6) 
describes the true decomposition of the gender wage gap in quantiles.  
Note that the first and third terms do not have exactly the same meaning as in the case of an 
OB decomposition due to the previously described assignment strategy. As an example, the 
counterfactual log wage  for women is only based on the establishment characteristics of 
men with comparable individual characteristics. Thus, if there is no overlap between certain 
parts of the male and the female sample with respect to individual characteristics, the 
establishment characteristics of the corresponding male sub-sample is not used for the 
1w
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counterfactual female wage distribution . As a consequence, the contribution of 
establishment characteristics to the decomposition part (i) is not necessarily cancelled out, 
but leaves some unknown residual. Similarly, decomposition part (iii) does not necessarily 
hold because the counterfactual establishment characteristics for women only refer to men 
who are comparable with regard to their individual characteristics. In other words, 
decomposition parts (i) and (iii) do not show the pure contribution of differences in 
individual characteristics and differences in establishment characteristics of male and female 
employees, but only hold in approximation. However, if male and female employees are not 
systematically different, i.e. there is a common support along the whole range of individual 
characteristics, than this residual effect is zero and term (i) and (iii) hold exactly.
1w
8 
4 Data and specification  
4.1 General construction of the data 
The empirical analysis is based on the IAB Linked Employer-Employee panel (LIAB) which 
combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment Statistics Register. 
The first data set, the IAB Establishment Panel, is an annual survey of German 
establishments administered since 1993.9 The database is a representative sample of German 
establishments employing at least one employee who pays social security contributions. 
During the time of analysis around 84 percent of all employed persons in Germany are 
covered by the social security system. The survey was administered through personal 
interviews and provides general information on the establishment, such as investments, 
revenues, size, composition of the workforce, salaries and wages. 
The second data set, the so-called Employment Statistics Register, is an administrative 
register data set of all employees in Germany paying social security contributions.10 In order 
to comply with legal requirements, employers have to provide information to the social 
security agencies for all employees who pay social security contributions. Due to its 
administrative nature, this database provides reliable information on the daily earnings that 
are subject to social security contributions. Furthermore, the data include information on age, 
gender, occupation, employment status and education. The date of entry into the 
establishment and the ending date of the employer’s notification are also available in the 
 11
                                                 
8 For my analysis, these residuals turn out to be small when using a random assignment of female individual 
covariates and male firm characteristics.   
9 Eastern German establishments are surveyed since 1996. Detailed information on the IAB Establishment Panel 
is given by Kölling (2000).  
10 Information on the Employment Statistics Register is given by Bender et al. (2000). 
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individual data and are used to calculate job tenure. Note, however, that this tenure variable 
cannot be corrected for employment breaks as this information is not available. Hence this 
variable is only a proxy for tenure.  
The sample for the subsequent analysis of the linked employer-employee data is constructed 
in two steps: First, I select establishments from the establishment panel data set for the year 
2002.11 I exclude firms from eastern Germany and non-profit firms because both the wage 
level as well as the wage setting process is still different in those firms and would require a 
separate analysis. Furthermore, I only consider firms with at least 10 employees.  
In the second step, the establishment data are merged with the notifications for all employees 
employed by the selected establishments in 2002. From the worker data, I eliminate 
foreigners, apprentices, part-time workers and home workers in order to ensure that the 
dependent and the independent variables are comparable for my sample. I restrict the 
analysis to employees who are between 25 and 55 years old to avoid inference with ongoing 
education and early retirement. Since I consider only full-time workers, I also drop those 
whose wage is less than twice the lower social security contribution limit or have more than 
one employment. I am aware that by dropping part-time workers I exclude a lot of women 
from the analysis. However, the data set includes only information on the daily wage rate 
and no information of working hours. Thus, it is not possible to calculate wage rates per 
hour. Controlling for the working status by a dummy variable would also lead to improper 
results because part-time working can comprise a range of three to six hours. For this reason, 
I decide to limit my analysis to full-time workers. The final sample contains 384,908 male 
and 98,368 female employees in 3,994 establishments.  
The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis is the log real gross daily wage. The wage 
also contains all fringe benefits that are subject to social security contributions. The reported 
wage rates are top-coded at the upper contribution limit to the social security system. In the 
sample, top-coding affects 18.1 percent of all observations. Male employees are more 
affected by top-coding than female employees.12 While in the subsample of male employees 
the wage is censored above the 81st quantile of the male wage distribution, the censoring of 
the female wage distribution appears above the 93rd quantile.  
To address this problem, a Tobit regression is estimated by gender with log daily wage as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the same individual and establishment 
covariates as in the decomposition analysis later on. Then, as described in Gartner (2005), 
 
11 From the available waves 1993 to 2003, I use one wave, the year 2002, since the estimation procedure does 
not allow for more observations.  
12 Top-coding affects 20.6 percent of all men and 8.5 percent of all women.  
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right-censored observations are replaced by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal 
distribution. Predicted values from Tobit wage regressions are used to construct the moments 
of the truncated normal distribution. The lower truncation point of the distribution is the 
contribution limit to the social security system. 
4.2 Individual and establishment covariates 
In order to estimate log wage equations, I use a set of individual characteristics and a set of 
establishment characteristics. Thus both labor supply and labor demand aspects of the wage 
setting process are taken into account.  
The set of individual characteristics should capture the productivity of individuals. These 
variables include six formal skill dummies, age, age squared, job tenure and six dummies for 
occupational categories.13 Table A1 (in the appendix) presents summary statistics of the 
individual characteristics used in the subsequent analysis. The summary statistic shows that, 
on average, male employees are older and have longer job tenures than female employees. 
Most male and female employees have a vocational training degree, yet the share of men is 
higher than the share of women. Furthermore, many females do not have any vocational 
training and the share of women without a degree is higher than the proportion of men. The 
summary statistic also indicates that most male employees in the sample are blue collar 
workers, while most female employees work in administrative occupations.   
While there are numerous theoretical and empirical studies discussing the effect of human 
capital variables (see e.g. Mincer 1974, Card 1999), there is no “universally accepted” set of 
establishment variables that should be included when investigating determinants of wages. 
However, as there is widespread empirical evidence that different establishments may pay 
different wages to employees of equal ability (see e.g. Groshen 1991b, Abowd and Kramarz 
1999, Cardoso 2000)14, I attempt to account for these differences by including establishment 
characteristics. Motivated by studies which investigate single aspects of establishment wage 
differentials (for instance employer size or bargaining regime wage differentials), I gather 
various establishment characteristics as wage determinants. First, I include variables 
describing the workforce within establishments. These are the number of employees and its 
square as well as the gender and qualification composition. The positive impact of the 
 
13 Unfortunately, I cannot control for employment interruptions and the actual labor market experience. This 
could lead to a bias in the estimation, especially for female employees. However, the data set does not include 
such information.  
14 There is also earlier research on wage differentials that highlighted the relevance of wage policies at the firm 
level (see the overview by Kerr 1994).  
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establishment size has been widely discussed in the literature (see for an overview Oi and 
Idson 1999) which considers the size typically as a proxy for various unobserved 
determinants such as job satisfaction, monitoring costs, more complex technologies and 
worker participation in monopoly profits.15 Other studies (see e.g. Carrington and Troske 
1998, Reilly and Wirjianto 1999, Datta Gupta and Rothstein 2005) stress the negative 
relationship between the female proportion within establishments and wages.16 The effect of 
the qualification level of the workforce can be explained by sorting theories. According to 
these, the quality of a worker has an impact on the productivity of his or her co-workers (see, 
for example, the model of Kremer 1993).   
In addition, I take into account establishment characteristics capturing the current profit-
situation and the long run profitability. The theory of rent sharing in the labor market 
predicts that firms generating rents on the product market may share them with their 
workforce (e.g. Abowd and Lemieux 1993, Blanchflowers et al. 1996). The extent of rent 
sharing depends on the relative bargaining power of employers and employees. The theory 
therefore predicts that employees in more profitable firms may earn higher wages than 
workers in less successful firms. Therefore, I include sales per employee and two dummy 
variables indicating whether the revenues of the establishment increased or decreased during 
the last year. Furthermore, the share of exports in total sales is used as a wage determinant. 
This variable reflects the extent of product market competition under which firms operate. In 
the literature, there is the hypothesis that exporting renders firms more productive and leads 
to higher wages (see e.g. Bernard and Wagner 1997, Bernard and Jensen 1999). The reason 
is that exporting firms are forced to improve faster than firms only operating on the national 
market due to higher stress of competition. However, the recent theoretical literature (e.g. 
Melitz 2003) argues that the positive relationship between productivity and exporting is due 
to a self-selection of more productive firms into foreign markets. The empirical findings of 
Schank et al. (2010) support this latter argument for Germany. Overall, one would expect a 
positive relationship between wages and the share of exports in total sales. In order to further 
control for firm productivity, estimations include a discrete choice variable indicating the 
state-of-the-art of the production technology used in the establishment. 
Furthermore, labor market institutions are taken into account. In Germany the most 
important institution is collective wage bargaining. A large theoretical and empirical 
 
15 Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) find that when using all possible controls, wages increase with firm size. 
They conclude that there have to exist other reasons why large firms are able to pay higher wages and 
nevertheless survive. A possible explanation might be non-production economics of scale. 
16 In the next chapter I investigate the relationship for Germany.  
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literature shows that collective bargaining raises wages and reduces wage inequality (e.g. 
Blau and Kahn 1996, Card et al. 2003, Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005, Gürtzgen 2006). Some 
studies also examine the effect of collective bargaining on the entire wage distribution (e.g. 
Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005, Burda et al. 2008, Fitzenberger et al. 2008). In the analysis, I 
consider collective bargaining by including dummy variables indicating whether the 
establishment is covered by an industry-wide or firm-specific wage agreement.17 In addition 
to collective wage contracts, works councils have an impact on wage distributions within 
establishments (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Although works councils’ co-determination rights 
do not formally include negotiating over wages, they may negotiate about placing workers in 
higher wage groups. Among other things they can also co-decide on the introduction of new 
payment schene, overtime work and working conditions. Freeman and Lazear (1995) point 
out that co-determination confirms the bargaining power of employees. Hübler and Jirjahn 
(2003) argue that on the one hand works councils strengthen trust and cooperation between 
the management and the workforce. Thus, the works councils can support the management 
in implementing new productivity-enhancing work practices. On the other hand, works 
councils can also prevent the implementation of work practices which are not desired by the 
workforce. Thus, co-determination may considerably weaken the management’s bargaining 
position. Overall, one can conclude that the presence of works councils may have an impact 
on both the creation and redistribution of economic rents. Thus, I also control for the 
presence of a works council. 
Further establishment controls in the wage equation are the wage bill per employee, the 
number of the average agreed working hours, a dummy variable indicating whether the 
establishment has been found after 1989 and 10 industry dummies. 
The descriptive statistics of the establishment characteristics are given in Table A2. The 
summary statistics indicate that male employees, on average, work in larger, more export-
orientated firms than female employees. Further men are rather employed in establishments 
applying wage agreements and with higher sales per employee than women. There are only 
small differences between an average man’s and an average woman’s workplace regarding 
the state of the technology, the presence of a works council in the establishment and profits 
of the last year.  
 
17 In Germany, industry-specific unions and employers’ associations negotiate industry-wide agreements. Then 
the agreement is applied to all member firms of the employers’ association who signed the contract. A firm can 
also directly negotiate with a labor union if the firm is not member of an employers’ association. Empirical 
studies (e.g. Stephan and Gerlach 2005, Gürtzgen 2006, Fitzenberger et al. 2008) provide evidence of a positive 
and significant wage premium of industry-wide and firm-specific wage agreements for western Germany.  
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Distribution of the gender wage gap 
Before I present and discuss my estimation and decomposition results I address the actual raw 
gender wage gap. Thus, all following statements refer to wage rates after the imputation (as 
described in Section 4.1). The usual procedure to measure the male-female wage gap is to 
consider the differences between the average male wage and its female counterpart. In my 
sample, the average male daily wage is 105.47 Euro, whereas the average daily wage for 
women is 83.40 Euro. Therefore, the male-female average wage differential is 22.07 Euro. 
When I undertake the same calculation but consider log daily wages, the male-female average 
wage gap turns out to be 0.2347 log points. Thus, in my sample women earn, on average, 
about 23.5 percent less than men.   
Figure 1 shows nonparametric estimates of the density functions of male and female (log) 
daily wages.18 The male wage density is placed rightward with respect to the female wage 
distribution, indicating a non negligible raw gender wage gap.  
Figure 1: Density functions of male and female (log) daily wages  
 
 
Note: Kernel density wage estimation of man and women use Epanechnikov kernel function. The daily log wage 
rate after imputation is used.     
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001. 
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18 Densities are estimated using an adaptive Epanechnikov kernel. The peak (in particular in the function for 
male employees) reflects a cluster of wages below the threshold above which wages are top-coded.  
Figure 2: Gender wage gap at quantiles 
 
Note: The gender wage gap is the difference between the log wage rate of male and female employees at the 
quantiles of the wage distribution.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001. 
 
Figure 2 plots the raw gender wage gap as a function at quantiles of the wage distributions.19 
The gap is distributed unequally across the wage distribution. The wage gap lies above its 
mean at low wages, drops below the mean around the 30th percentile and keeps on falling 
until the 60th percentile.  
In contrast to other countries like Sweden (Albrecht et al. 2003), Spain (Gardeazabal and 
Ugidos 2005), Finnland or Denmark (see Arulampalam et al. 2007), the wage gap across the 
wage distribution has no increasing trend in Germany. Based on other sample definitions and 
data sets, Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005) and Hübler (2005) also find that the German 
gender wage gap is large in the lower part of the wage distribution and decreases as the 
quantiles increase. This falling tendency is not completely confirmed by Arulampalam et al. 
(2007). They reveal a u-shaped form of the wage gap. Figure 2 resembles the falling 
tendency of the wage gap with increasing quantiles. Whether it is increasing again in the 
upper tail of the wage distributions cannot be examined due to top-coding of wages. Still, the 
gender wage gap is far from being stable across the wage distribution.  
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19 I present the gap only until the 80th percentile, because the latter percentiles are too unreliable implicated by 
the imputation.  
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5.2 Regression results 
The first step in the empirical analysis of the gender wage differential is to estimate the log 
wage equations for male and female employees. As discussed in Section 4.2, in addition to 
individual characteristics, establishment characteristics serve as covariates.  
As mentioned in Section 3.2, for the gap decomposition across the wage distribution, it is 
necessary to estimate the wage by quantile regressions at each percentile of the wage 
distribution. In sum, this decomposition requires to run 99 quantile regressions for male and 
99 quantile regressions for female employees. For comparison, I also present the 
decomposition of the average pay gap, for example OB decomposition. For this, I estimate 
separate wage equations by OLS for men and women.  
Table A3 and Table A4 in the appendix show the OLS coefficients with their standard errors 
and the coefficient estimated by quantile regressions for a subset of quantiles of the 
distributions20. All estimated effects in the OLS regressions are significantly different from 
zero. The variables describing the human capital have the expected effects for both male and 
female employees: wages increase with the education level, age indicating potential 
experience and job tenure. The findings also show that, on average, unqualified and qualified 
blue collar workers as well as individuals in service occupations earn much less than 
employees in an administrative occupation. That holds for male and female employees. The 
estimated quantile regression coefficients for the individual characteristics show the same 
pattern as in the OLS regressions, but vary across the wage distribution. The effect of tertiary 
education levels, such as a university or a technical university degree, decreases with 
increasing quantiles of the wage distribution for male employees, while the impact of this 
covariate increases with increasing quantiles for women. The same holds for the variable 
age. Without having standard errors, these findings should only be interpreted as some 
indication.  
Turning to the establishment variables, I find that wage rates increase with the number of 
employees and with the share of highly qualified employees for both men and women. The 
OLS regressions indicate that the share of female employees affects the wage rate of women 
and men negatively. This negative impact might reflect a sorting of women into firms with a 
preferred work environment for which lower compensating wages are paid. This hypothesis 
as well as alternative explanations are intensely investigated in the next chapter. The quantile 
 
20 The results for the other percentiles are available upon request from the author. 
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regression results show that the impact of variables describing the workforce decreases with 
increasing quantiles of the wage distribution for male and female employees. 
The OLS findings further indicate that establishments with higher sales per employee, good 
results in the last year and a state-of-the-art production technology tend to pay higher wage 
rates both for male and female employees. Apparently, the workforce benefits from the 
success of the establishment in terms of higher wage rates. The export quota has a positive 
impact on the wage rate in the OLS regression. This indicates that exporting establishments 
are more productive and able to pay higher wages rates than establishments operating only 
on the national market. Whether this result is due to self-selection of more productive 
establishments in entering the foreign market or due to an increase of the productivity driven 
by international competition can not be concluded from this kind of analysis (see Schank et 
al. 2010). 
Furthermore, the OLS findings indicate that establishments covered by an industry-wide or 
firm-specific wage agreement tend to pay higher wage rates than establishments which do 
not apply such wage agreements. Note that the impact of these institutional variables 
decreases with increasing quantiles of the wage distribution for both male and female 
employees. This finding can be explained by the compression of the wage distributions due 
to collective bargaining and is in line with Burda et al. (2008). Furthermore, the OLS results 
reveal a strong positive effect of works councils on the wage rate. Note, that the estimated 
coefficient for this covariate is much higher for women than for men. As the quantile 
regression estimates show, the impact also increases with increasing quantiles of the wage 
distribution. The findings regarding the impact of works councils on wages and the wage 
distribution are in line with Addison et al. (2010) who study this issue for Germany.  
5.3 Decomposition results 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the estimated quantile regression coefficients and randomly 
drawn samples of male and female covariates are used to simulate counterfactual wage 
distributions. The decomposition of the gender wage gap across the wage distributions is 
implemented, as shown in equation (6). Table 1 presents the gender wage gap and the four 
decomposition parts at eight deciles. Unfortunately, due to computational constraints at the 
research data center, I cannot provide standard errors.   
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Table 1: MM decomposition at selected quantiles and OB decomposition  
 Wage differential due to difference in … Quantiles Gender 
wage gap  individual 
characteristics 
returns to 
individual 
characteristics 
establishment 
characteristics 
returns to 
establishment 
characteristics 
0.1 0.3256  0.0207 0.0066 0.0493 0.2255 
0.2 0.2405  0.0089 -0.0095 0.0391 0.2153 
0.3 0.2218  -0.0024 -0.0126 0.0350 0.2107 
0.4 0.2122  -0.0131 -0.0077 0.0326 0.2044 
0.5 0.2054  -0.0250 0.0027 0.0281 0.1996 
0.6 0.2035  -0.0330 0.0139 0.0236 0.1955 
0.7 0.2098  -0.0297 0.0257 0.0197 0.1875 
0.8 0.2159  -0.0114 0.0410 0.0168 0.1643 
OB 0.2347  -0.0224 0.0470 0.0509 0.1592 
Note: The results are based on the log of the imputed daily wage. The gender wage gaps are calculated as the 
difference between log male wages and log female wages.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
 
For comparison, the last row in Table 1 includes the mean gender wage gap and four 
decomposition parts based on an OB decomposition (see equation (4)). As mentioned before, 
the mean gender wage gap is 23.5 percent. The largest proportion of the observed raw wage 
gap is explained by differences in returns to establishment characteristics. Thus, if male and 
female employees were comparable regarding their individual and establishment 
characteristics and they had the same returns to their individual characteristics, then 
nevertheless women would earn 16 percent less on average than men. This could be 
interpreted as a pay gap within firms and is in line with a result of Hinz and Gartner (2005). 
By contrast, the contribution of the differences in individual characteristics to the mean pay 
gap is small and negative. This implies that on average, women would receive lower wages 
if they had the same endowment of productivity-related individual characteristics as male 
employees. This result suggests that full-time employed women are well educated.  
Furthermore, the OB decomposition shows that the gap attributable to differences in 
establishment characteristics and the gap referring to differences in the returns to individual 
characteristics are equally high.  
The OB decomposition is limited to decomposing the mean gender wage gap. The MM 
decomposition based on quantile regression considers the entire wage distribution. The four 
decomposition parts at each percentile of the wage distributions are also presented in 
Figure 3. The extreme quantiles are not presented because of unrobust estimates.   
Figure 3: MM decomposition of the gender wage gap 
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Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
 
The decomposition terms vary across the quantiles of the wage distribution. However, the 
variation is not as strong as other international studies indicate that only take into account 
individual characteristics (e.g. Albrecht et al. 2003 for Sweden, De la Rica et al. 2008 for 
Spain, Arulampalam et al. 2007 among other countries also for Germany). The estimated 
quantile regression coefficients already provide first hints on these relatively small variations 
across the quantiles of the wage distribution.     
Similar to the OB decomposition, the largest fraction of the gender wage gap is attributable 
to differences in establishment-specific coefficients across the whole wage distribution. This 
finding is readily identifiable in Figure 3. This part of the pay gap slightly decreases with 
increasing quantiles of the wage distributions. Apparently, women benefit less from rents 
which might be shared between employer and employees than male colleagues. Or in other 
words, women tend to participate less in the success of the establishment, especially in the 
lower wage groups. Maybe, they are more diffident in wage negotiations with their superior 
or they have less bargaining power in comparison to male employees.   
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that there is a male wage premium for the establishment 
characteristics across the whole distribution. This part also slightly decreases as the quantiles 
increase. In the lower part of the wage distribution women tend to work in firms which are 
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less productive and profitable in comparison to firms where men are typically employed. 
This also contributes considerably to the gender wage gap. The differences in establishment 
characteristics are less important for the gap in the upper tail of the wage distribution. It 
seems that male and female employees in the upper tail of the wage distribution work in 
similar firms. Unfortunately, I cannot say anything about the statistical significance because 
the calculation of significance bonds with a bootstrap method is not possible given the 
computation time. 
The fraction of the gender wage gap that is attributable to differences in individual 
characteristics and the part due to differences in the returns to those characteristics vary 
around zero along the wage distribution. In the lower part of the wage distribution the 
fraction due to differences in individual characteristics is positive. Below the 30th percentile, 
men are endowed with the better paid productivity-related characteristics. By contrast, the 
reverse holds from above the 30th percentile. This suggests that women in the middle and the 
upper tail of the wage distribution receive a higher wage rate given their better human capital 
endowment and their occupations, ceteris paribus.  
The decomposition part due to differences in returns to individual characteristics is at first 
negative and then becomes positive. Between the 15th and the 45th percentile of the wage 
distribution women get higher returns for their human capital endowment than male 
employees.  
The findings of the OB decomposition of the mean gender wage gap and the MM 
decomposition of the gap across the whole distribution both suggest the selection of women 
into less successful and productive firms. In addition, women participate in the success of 
firms by rent-sharing to a lesser extent than their male colleagues. This is the source of the 
largest part of the pay gap. The firm and respectively the workplace seem to be very 
important in explaining wage differentials between male and female employees. This finding 
is line with results of Drolet (2002), Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) as well as Simón and 
Russell (2005). Gender differences in human capital and occupations as well as differences 
in returns to these characteristics are less responsible for the wage differential.  
6 Conclusions 
 
This study investigates the role of individual characteristics and the establishments in 
determining the gender wage gap across the whole wage distribution in Germany. It thus 
differs from existing analysis examining the decomposition of the gender wage gap in three 
respects. First, instead of limiting the explanatory variables to individual characteristics, I 
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include a set of detailed establishment characteristics. Second, I extend the traditional OB 
decomposition to disentangle the effect of human capital characteristics and the effect of 
establishment characteristics in explaining the gender wage gap. This approach yields new 
insights into what causes the gender wage gap. Are women less educated or do they work in 
worse firms compared to men? Third, I implement the decomposition across the entire wage 
distribution with the Machado Mata method.  
The unconditional gender gap is sharply decreasing within the first quartile of the wage 
distribution and then the decrease decelerates until the 60th percentile, and from then on the 
gap slightly increases. The gender wage gap is not constant across the wage distribution, but 
the decomposition terms only vary slightly across the wage distribution. This result suggests 
that the sources of the wage differential are similar for high- and low-paid employees. One 
methodological reason for this may be that the top-coding of the data prevents an analysis of 
the gender wage gap above the 80th percentile. Strong changes in the decomposition of the 
wage gap might only occur in the upper quantiles though. As a robustness check, a similar 
analysis with the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES), another large German 
linked employer-employee data set might be helpful.21  
The present analysis shows that the selection of women into less successful and productive 
firms explains a sizeable part of the gap. This selection is more pronounced in the lower part 
of the wage distribution than in the upper tail. In addition, women also benefit from the 
success of firms by rent-sharing to a lesser extent than their male colleagues. This suggests 
the largest part of the gap is a wage gap within firms. The establishment seems to be very 
important in explaining wage differentials between male and female employees. Gender 
differences in human capital endowment as well as differences in returns to human capital 
are less responsible for the wage differential. In the middle and upper part of the wage 
distribution women even have better paid individual characteristics compared to their male 
colleagues.  
These are important findings from a public policy viewpoint. In particular, the findings pose 
the question why women participate less in the success of firms and what can be done about 
it. An explanation for married or cohabitating women could be that they have less bargaining 
power within firms than their male colleagues if they face a limited number of alternative job 
opportunities due to being tied to the regional labor market of the male breadwinner. The 
weak bargaining position of women may thus partially reflect the weak bargaining position 
within their relationship. A separate analysis for single and married/cohabitating women 
 
21 The German Structure of Earnings Survey is a linked employer-employee data set. It is conducted by the 
Federal Statistical Office. However, the establishment information is not so rich as in the LIAB.  
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might shed light on the relevance of this argument. If women’s weaker bargaining position 
proves relevant, policies aiming at a reduction of the gender wage gap should strengthen 
women’s bargaining position in the private sphere by for example improving the public child 
care infrastructure or abolishing the employment disincentive inherent in the German tax 
system. In addition, women – irrespective of their marital status – might be too hesitant 
compared to their male colleagues to demand the merits of their work as a share of the firm’s 
rents. If this was the case, women should be encouraged to seek wage negotiations with the 
aim of enjoying greater financial rewards. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Summary statistics of individual characteristics for male and female 
employees 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.   Mean Std. dev. 
Log wage (imputated)  4.6584 0.3225  4.4237 0.3776 
Log wage (censored)  4.6205 0.2610  4.4089 0.3492 
Age 40.7127 7.8045  39.5960 8.3721 
Job tenure (in month) 138.0195 98.6705  119.0050 93.6713 
Low education without vocational 
training degree 
0.1161 0.3204  0.2033 0.4024 
Vocational training degree 0.7030 0.4569  0.6229 0.4847 
High school without vocational training 
degree 
0.0065 0.0802  0.0122 0.1096 
High school with vocational training 
degree 
0.0319 0.1758  0.0704 0.2559 
Technical university degree 0.0728 0.2598  0.0340 0.1812 
University degree 0.0697 0.2546  0.0572 0.2323 
Simple blue-collar occupation 0.2549 0.4358  0.2211 0.4150 
Qualified blue-collar occupation 0.2346 0.4237  0.0445 0.2062 
Engineer 0.1965 0.3973  0.0812 0.2732 
Service occupation  0.1177 0.3222  0.0886 0.2841 
Clerical and administrative occupation 0.1480 0.3551  0.4771 0.4995 
Profession, manager and others 0.0483 0.2145  0.0876 0.2827 
Number of employees 384,908  98,368 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
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Table A2: Summary statistics of establishment characteristics for male and female 
employess 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Employment size (1/103) 2.3976 3.9996  1.7425 3.0503 
Proportion of female employees 0.2089 0.1604  0.3976 0.2354 
Proportion of highly qualified 
employees 
0.6855 0.2527  0.6500 0.2625 
Business start-up after 1989 0.1484 0.3555  0.1473 0.3544 
Export quota (sales) 0.3077 0.2956  0.2512 0.2821 
Wage bill per employee (1/103) 5.8003 2.0433  5.3250 2.3203 
Sales per employee (1/105) 5.0887 13.6998  5.3275 19.7887 
Good results last year 0.3595 0.4799  0.3527 0.4778 
Bad results last year  0.2826 0.4503  0.2895 0.4535 
Average results last year 0.3579 0.4794  0.3578 0.4793 
State of the technology 2.9817 0.7145  2.9974 0.7160 
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.7778 0.4157  0.7286 0.4447 
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.1128 0.3163  0.1048 0.3063 
No wage agreement 0.1094 0.3122  0.1667 0.3727 
Works council 0.9156 0.2780  0.8733 0.3326 
Average weekly working hours 36.7957 1.8723  37.2115 1.7615 
Agriculture and forestry, electricity, 
gas and water supply, mining 
0.0384 0.1922  0.0251 0.1564 
Manufacturing I 0.2190 0.4136  0.1785 0.3830 
Manufacturing II 0.4981 0.5000  0.4113 0.4921 
Construction 0.0344 0.1822  0.0148 0.1206 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0541 0.2262  0.1341 0.3407 
Transport and communication 0.0687 0.2530  0.0462 0.2100 
Financial intermediation 0.0013 0.0360  0.0010 0.0320 
Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
0.0527 0.2235  0.0695 0.2543 
Education  0.0028 0.0524  0.0056 0.0746 
Other service activities 0.0306 0.1721  0.1138 0.3176 
Berlin-West 0.0432 0.2034  0.0583 0.2343 
Schleswig Holstein 0.0503 0.2185  0.0602 0.2379 
Hamburg  0.0588 0.2352  0.0522 0.2225 
Lower Saxony  0.0841 0.2775  0.0745 0.2625 
Bremen  0.0298 0.1700  0.0352 0.1843 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.1982 0.3986  0.1681 0.3739 
Hesse  0.1332 0.3398  0.1330 0.3395 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.0472 0.2120  0.0559 0.2298 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1290 0.3352  0.1572 0.3640 
Bavaria  0.1668 0.3728  0.1664 0.3724 
Saarland  0.0595 0.2365  0.0391 0.1937 
Number of employees 384,908  98,368 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
 
  27
 
Table A3: Estimates of OLS and Quantile wage regressions for male employees 
  OLS regression  Quantile regression 
      θ=0.10 θ=0.25 θ=0.50 θ=0.75
Variables Coeff. Std. err.   Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Age 0.0374*** 0.0004 0.0341 0.0335 0.0305 0.0299
Age squared (1/102) -0.0398*** 0.0005 -0.0376 -0.0363 -0.0325 -0.0313
Low education without vocational 
training degree 
-0.0936*** 0.0011 -0.0844 -0.0798 -0.0775 -0.0845
Vocational training degree 
(reference) 
- -  - - - -
High school without vocational 
training degree 
0.0442*** 0.0041 -0.0138 0.0323 0.0631 0.0603
High school with vocational 
training degree 
0.0858*** 0.0019 0.0563 0.0688 0.0872 0.0916
Technical university degree 0.2146*** 0.0014 0.2432 0.2218 0.2054 0.1978
University degree 0.2937*** 0.0015 0.3164 0.3046 0.2838 0.2692
Simple blue-collar occupation -0.2594*** 0.0012 -0.1507 -0.2034 -0.2695 -0.3272
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.2087*** 0.0012 -0.1137 -0.1610 -0.2228 -0.2735
Engineer 0.0259*** 0.0012 0.0599 0.0448 0.0230 0.0072
Service occupation  -0.2566*** 0.0014 -0.1846 -0.2195 -0.2739 -0.3099
Clerical and administrative 
occupation (reference)  
- -  - - - -
Profession, manager and others 0.0540*** 0.0018 0.0536 0.0707 0.0696 0.0599
Job tenure (in month) (1/102) 0.0334*** 0.0004 0.0417 0.0359 0.0315 0.0299
Employment size (1/103) 0.0179*** 0.0003 0.0224 0.0212 0.0200 0.0151
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0007*** 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0005
Proportion of female employees -0.0970*** 0.0024 -0.1362 -0.1289 -0.1035 -0.0719
Proportion of highly qualified 
employees 
0.0803*** 0.0015 0.0767 0.0569 0.0589 0.0648
Business start-up after 1989 0.0389*** 0.0010 0.0305 0.0426 0.0479 0.0433
Export quota (sales) 0.0099*** 0.0015 0.0107 0.0090 0.0019 0.0012
Wage bill per employee (1/103) 0.0230*** 0.0002 0.0231 0.0271 0.0289 0.0279
Sales per employee (1/105) 0.0005*** 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Good results last year 0.0159*** 0.0008 0.0140 0.0147 0.0168 0.0156
Bad results last year  -0.0072*** 0.0009 -0.0110 -0.0068 -0.0038 -0.0055
Average results last year 
(reference)  
- -  - - - -
State of the technology 0.0136*** 0.0005 0.0122 0.0146 0.0133 0.0127
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.0366*** 0.0013 0.0634 0.0472 0.0368 0.0207
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.0214*** 0.0016 0.0240 0.0231 0.0224 0.0130
No wage agreement (reference)  - -  - - - -
Works council 0.0870*** 0.0014 0.1177 0.0940 0.0762 0.0619
Average weekly working hours -0.0097*** 0.0002 -0.0113 -0.0103 -0.0090 -0.0084
Constant 3.8928*** 0.0125  3.6841 3.8116 4.0144 4.1908
R2 0.6077      
Number of observations 384,908  384,908 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the imputed daily wage. Controls for regions and industries are 
also included in estimations. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent, Quantile 
regressions are without standard errors.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
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Table A 4: Estimates OLS and Quantile wage regressions for female employees 
  OLS regression  Quantile regression 
      θ=0.10 θ=0.25 θ=0.50 θ=0.75
 Variables Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Age 0.0241*** 0.0010 -0.0014 0.0194 0.0305 0.0351
Age squared (1/102) -0.0263*** 0.0013 0.0020 -0.0227 -0.0350 -0.0395
Low education without vocational 
training degree 
-0.0843*** 0.0025 -0.0602 -0.0639 -0.0715 -0.0816
Vocational training degree 
(reference) 
- - - - - -
High school without vocational 
training degree 
0.0712*** 0.0078 -0.0220 0.0249 0.0780 0.1225
High school with vocational 
training degree 
0.1142*** 0.0035 0.0792 0.0834 0.0968 0.1245
Technical university degree 0.2569*** 0.0049 0.2160 0.2255 0.2519 0.2697
University degree 0.3563*** 0.0040 0.3008 0.3204 0.3565 0.3890
Simple blue-collar occupation -0.1913*** 0.0028 -0.0675 -0.1395 -0.1963 -0.2478
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.1844*** 0.0044 -0.1033 -0.1533 -0.1975 -0.2212
Engineer 0.0154*** 0.0034 0.0554 0.0330 0.0101 -0.0115
Service occupation  -0.1560*** 0.0034 -0.1357 -0.1554 -0.1487 -0.1443
Clerical and administrative 
occupation (reference)  
- - - - - -
Profession, manager and others 0.0860*** 0.0037 0.1170 0.1113 0.0960 0.0765
Job tenure (in month) (1/102) 0.0428*** 0.0011 0.0524 0.0457 0.0401 0.0343
Employment size (1/103) 0.0270*** 0.0009 0.0381 0.0300 0.0247 0.0188
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0010*** 0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0006
Proportion of female employees -0.0762*** 0.0049 -0.0939 -0.0862 -0.0902 -0.0794
Proportion of highly qualified 
employees 
0.1406*** 0.0039 0.1896 0.1094 0.0825 0.0883
Business start-up after 1989 0.0431*** 0.0026 0.0181 0.0271 0.0427 0.0488
Export quota (sales) 0.0476*** 0.0042 0.0222 0.0422 0.0480 0.0364
Wage bill per employee (1/103) 0.0304*** 0.0004 0.0249 0.0355 0.0395 0.0421
Sales per employee (1/105) 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
Good results last year 0.0222*** 0.0021 0.0215 0.0276 0.0257 0.0255
Bad results last year  0.0073*** 0.0022 -0.0054 0.0095 0.0116 0.0140
Average results last year 
(reference)  
- - - - - -
State of the technology 0.0130*** 0.0013 0.0123 0.0103 0.0086 0.0066
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.0470*** 0.0028 0.0923 0.0572 0.0483 0.0357
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.0270*** 0.0038 0.0742 0.0377 0.0255 0.0160
No wage agreement (reference)  - - - - - -
Works council 0.1555*** 0.0031 0.2766 0.1934 0.1315 0.1054
Average weekly working hours -0.0193*** 0.0007 -0.0257 -0.0205 -0.0206 -0.0172
Constant 4.1050*** 0.0322  4.4006 4.0757 4.0733 4.0419
R2 0.4992   
Number of observations 98,368  98,368 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the imputed daily wage. Controls for regions and industries are 
also included in estimations. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent, Quantile 
regressions are without standard errors. 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
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